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**Synergy at its Best: Fostering a Cooperative Relationship Between the
Joint Force Commander and In-Theater NGOs**

By


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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) have existed since the Seventeenth century. Because of the nature of their work, people from these organizations will function alongside U.S. Military personnel in virtually every type of operation. A basic understanding of the culture and philosophy of the NGO/PVO community will help the Joint Force Commander (JFC) establish and develop the synergistic relationship required for both organizations to achieve maximum success.

The fundamental principles of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provide an outstanding template to aid the JFC in understanding what drives the NGO/PVO community. After analyzing his own objectives with these fundamental principles in mind, the operational commander can compare his goals with the goals of the NGO. This practice may lead to unity of effort.

An examination of the military/NGO relationship in Haiti, Central America, and Kosovo illuminates some of the challenges the JFC faces when conducting complex humanitarian missions. From an analysis of these challenges, the JFC can take some proactive steps to improve his chances of achieving the desired synergistic relationship with the in-theater NGOs. Consistent application of existing doctrine, professional education, and solid operational leadership will help both the JFC and his NGO/PVO partners accomplish their equally challenging missions.

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Introduction

The symbol of a Red Cross on a white background generates universal recognition. Whether on the battlefield following an intense firefight, or on a farmer's field following a destructive tornado, the symbol evokes the same positive response from people: "Thank God, help has arrived." However, for the Joint Force Commander, as welcome as the flag of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) might be, it may also signal a monumental challenge. For the ICRC will likely be just one of many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) present and actively participating in the same theater of operations as a Joint Task Force (JTF). From peace operations to disaster relief efforts, the NGO has become a ubiquitous entity. The Joint Force Commander must acknowledge their presence and, if he hopes to achieve maximum success, must actively engage them in the planning and execution of his operation. This is particularly true at the low intensity end of the conflict spectrum, in missions such as humanitarian assistance and peace operations; but it will also hold true during full-scale combat operations. One need only look to the current conflict in Kosovo, and its attendant refugee crisis, to see the need for cooperation between the Joint Force Commander and in-theater NGOs.

Official doctrine recognizes the role of the military in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The Department of Defense has generated numerous publications to aid commanders in the conduct of such operations. It is in OOTW that commanders will most likely find themselves operating with NGOs and the Joint Pub series thoroughly discusses this relationship. Despite this official recognition in the literature, some argue that the military has no business working closely with the NGO community. The author

hopes to show that this critical relationship exists today, and it is likely to exist well into the future.

After providing some historic background on NGOs, this paper will explore the ways the Joint Force Commander and his staff can best develop the required synergistic relationship with in-theater NGOs. Using case studies in Haiti, Central America (following Hurricane Mitch), and Kosovo, the paper will demonstrate the challenges the Joint Force Commander faces concerning his relationship with the NGOs. After an in-depth analysis of these challenges, the paper will offer viable solutions to help create the synergy required for the JFC to succeed along with the in-theater NGOs.

Historical Background

Although the past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of NGOs and the scope of their operations, they are not new. Brian Smith, in his work More Than Altruism: the Politics of Private Foreign Aid writes, "The oldest of the international aid sending groups in western societies were church related. Beginning in the early seventeenth century, religious orders and congregations sent personnel and resources to the Americas, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East."¹ He further contends that, in addition to their missionary work, these organizations performed a variety of social and humanitarian tasks.² Organizations such as these marked the start of the modern NGO movement.

The International Committee of the Red Cross traces its roots "back to an episode of violence, of humanity, and of volunteerism."³ In 1859, in the town of Solferino in

Northern Italy, Henry Dunant of Geneva, Switzerland organized a group of local volunteer citizens to aid the battlefield wounded. Later, Dunant would write A Memory of Solferino (1862), in which he would recommend that Army medical services be supplemented by volunteer relief societies "who would be regarded as neutral, even if called to the battlefield."⁴

Clearly, the origins of Non-Governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations have at their roots the human desire to assist those in need. Such a tradition aligns well with U.S. values and priorities. As a society, Americans pride themselves in rooting for the underdog and protecting the downtrodden. National policy supports this tradition. In his *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, President Clinton writes, "Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return in security and savings. Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic and long term effort focussed on both values and institutions. Our goal is a broadening of the community of market democracies, and strengthened international non-governmental movements committed to human rights and democratization."⁵ The American people and the highest level of the federal government support what the NGO community is trying to accomplish. The military should mirror that support.

NGO Structure and Culture

Today, the total number of internationally recognized NGOs is well over 16,000.⁶ They range in size from small organizations, with a dozen or so people, to large bureaucracies with thousands of volunteers and paid employees. All of these

organizations have the potential to work alongside the U.S. Military in every type of conceivable operation. A solid working knowledge of the structure and culture of the NGOs present in the theater will assist the operational commander and will help pave the way to the desired synergistic relationship.

What exactly is an NGO and how is one structured? Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, defines a Non-Governmental Organization as a "transnational organization of private citizens that maintains a consultative status with the economic and social council of the United Nations. NGOs may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities, such as development and relief. Non-Governmental Organization is normally a term used by non-U.S. organizations."⁷ A term often used synonymously with Non-Governmental Organization is Private Voluntary Organization or PVO.

The typical NGO exhibits a structure that lends itself to centralized planning and de-centralized execution. They locate the "corporate headquarters" in a large metropolitan area where coordination, fund raising, strategic planning, and recruitment and advertising takes place.⁸ However, the *raison d'être* occurs in the field. In every conflict, every natural disaster, every refugee situation NGOs will be on site, doing their work. Often, they will be in place before the arrival of the military and will remain in place long after the military departs. They concentrate on either relief or development and structure themselves accordingly. The relief organizations focus on providing food and supplies during natural and man-made disasters. They are experts in logistics and distribution systems and are re-active in nature. The development organizations focus on

building infrastructure and educating the populace. They are experts in community relations and local cultures and are pro-active in nature.⁹

More elusive than the actual definition and structure of an NGO, however, are the culture and philosophy of these organizations. Nevertheless, it is exactly this culture and philosophy that the Joint Force Commander must understand. Although there is a variety of philosophies and cultures among the NGOs, many of them share a common characteristic; they dedicate themselves to improving the welfare of their constituents through non-violent means. Their dedication to non-violence may result in an inherent distrust of the military and its members.¹⁰ This is the primary hurdle facing the Joint Force Commander and his staff concerning their relationship with the in-theater NGOs. Therefore, they must concentrate their efforts on overcoming this hurdle.

A close look at the International Committee of the Red Cross reveals the culture and philosophy of a typical NGO. The ICRC clearly defines its culture and philosophy through its seven fundamental principles: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, and Universality.¹¹ Not all NGOs may embrace these same seven fundamental principles; nevertheless, the first five principles represent a value system that most of these organizations share. The Joint Force Commander and his staff should consider these principles illustrative of an NGO philosophy. It would be a worthwhile exercise for the operational commander to evaluate his own mission using these fundamental principles and then compare his objectives to the objectives of the NGO. The results will likely predict potential breakdowns in communication and miscues in coordination between the Joint Force Commander and the in-theater NGOs. An examination of each principle follows.

Humanity

The ICRC describes humanity as the principle of bringing indiscriminate assistance to the battlefield wounded and alleviating human suffering. The goal is to protect life, guarantee respect for the human being, and promote mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace.¹² This poses a challenge to the operational commander involved in armed conflict. The use of violence does not sit well with the majority of the NGO community. However, the JFC must make a case for synchronizing his final objectives with the NGO's final objectives. Although the operational commander may have to accomplish his mission through violence, the antithesis of Humanity, his long term, ultimate goal is a restoration of peace. The Joint Force Commander and his staff must continuously emphasize this during interaction with the NGO personnel. Only then, will there be a chance to share a common purpose.

Impartiality

The ICRC describes impartiality as the principle of not discriminating about nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions.¹³ This principle aligns well with the values of today's military services. Equal opportunity is a basic tenant of all the services. The operational commander and his staff must demonstrate this to the NGOs on a daily basis through their behavior and actions.

Neutrality

The ICRC describes neutrality as the principle of not taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological

nature.¹⁴ By definition, if the Joint Force Commander is involved in armed conflict, he can not embrace this principle. However, if the Commander's mission is strictly a humanitarian one, such as JTF Bravo's disaster relief efforts in Central America following Hurricane Mitch, he and his staff can maintain and embrace neutrality.

Independence

The ICRC describes the principle of independence as autonomy from official governments at all times; although subject to in country and international law, there will be no official, binding agreements with any government agency.¹⁵ It is critical for the Joint Force Commander to recognize and respect the principle of independence with NGOs. He must realize that these organizations do not fall under his command and control. Rather, his goal should be to cooperate and coordinate with them. The relationship between the two is not mandated; however, if cultivated properly, it can be mutually beneficial. There may be some very real force protection issues concerning the NGO personnel. The Joint Force Commander must consider this factor in his planning, especially when the lives of American citizens are involved.

Voluntary Service

The principle of voluntary service simply means that the people involved are not doing it for their individual gain. Most are not paid much, if anything, for their efforts. In today's all volunteer force U.S. Military service members share this same principle. This is particularly true at the senior officer level (O-7 and above). Most could easily pursue other, more lucrative careers. However, they continue to do what they do because of love of country and the desire to keep serving with honor. The operational commander and his staff should emphasize this shared philosophy at every opportunity.

Unity and Universality

An analysis of the ICRC principles of Unity (one Red Cross society per country) and Universality (the Red Cross will have a worldwide presence) will not benefit the Joint Force Commander. These Red Cross principles do not correspond to any military principles. (The Red Cross principal of unity differs from the military principle of unity of effort.) It is important, however, for the JFC to know of their existence. Such knowledge will complete his picture of how the Red Cross operates.

Keeping this historical and cultural perspective in mind, it is time to examine three case studies that dramatically demonstrate the current challenges the Joint Force Commander faces when dealing with NGOs.

Haiti - Operation Uphold Democracy

In September of 1994, it appeared inevitable that the U. S. would lead a U. N. sanctioned multi-national force (MNF) in a hostile invasion of Haiti. The main objective of the mission would be to restore the democratically elected, legitimate government of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. Three years earlier, on 30 September 1991, a military coup orchestrated and led by General Raul Cedras, the leader of the Haitian military, ousted Aristide from power and forced him to flee the country.

However, the use of force during the invasion was narrowly averted. The eleventh hour diplomatic efforts of some senior ranking U.S. officials, including former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell, succeeded in diffusing the tensions and the U.S. led military force made an unopposed landing at

Port-Au-Prince, Haiti on 19 September 1994. General Cedras and his "cronies" departed the country and President Aristide resumed his position as leader of the impoverished nation.¹⁶ Although they would not encounter overt hostilities, the commander of the MNF, and later, the commander of UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), would still face many obstacles. They commanded a coalition force made up of soldiers from ten different nations, ranging from Bangladesh to Surinam. Their men struggled to identify potential belligerents. However, perhaps the biggest challenge that faced the commanders and his staff was dealing with the nearly thirty NGOs in the Haitian theater. These organizations were attempting to stabilize the economy and encourage sustainable development in one of the poorest countries on earth. (As a comparison, the Haitian GNP per capita is \$250.00; the U.S. GNP per capita is \$30,000.00.)¹⁷ Clearly, the operational commander had to generate maximum cooperation with the NGOs. The challenge lay in achieving this cooperation.

In comments following his assignment as JFC, UNMIH, General Kinzer stated, "The mission in Haiti clearly demonstrated that if the right conditions are created and sustained by the military component, and the military component is able to synchronize its actions with the international, diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian components--success is achievable."¹⁸ The JFC and his staff actively created conditions in Haiti that led to success. The following is a discussion of some of those conditions.

The last minute, successful negotiations by Carter, Nunn, and Powell shifted the focus of the armed MNF from potential hostilities to humanitarian efforts overnight. Their primary objective became to "restore democracy" to Haiti by ensuring the peaceful return of President Aristide. Establishing a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

became one of the staff's first orders of business. In Haiti, the JFC actually established two CMOCs: one in the capital of Port-Au-Prince, the other in Cape Haitien. A CMOC is a "coordination center established and tailored to assist the civil-military operations (CMO) officer in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating, and orchestrating those functions and activities pertaining to the civilian population, government, and economy in areas where armed Governmental Organizations (GOs), International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) are employed." However, unlike previous operations such as Rwanda and Somalia, the CMOCs in Haiti were not the primary locations for military/NGO interaction. Instead, the JFC created a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). The HACC served as a "liaison with all the International Organizations, such as the UN Deputy for Peacekeeping Operations, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the NGO community." This relatively simple disparity in terminology (use of a HACC vice a CMOC to interface with the NGOs) caused some initial confusion. Most of the NGOs that had operated with the military in previous situations were familiar with the term CMOC, but were not familiar with the term HACC. Although the confusion cleared up quickly, the situation highlights the importance of the consistent use of language across the spectrum of operations. This is especially critical in the world of civil-military relations.¹⁹

Another challenge that presented itself in Haiti was the surprising (at least to the JFC and his staff) lack of NGO personnel in theater immediately following the arrival of the Joint Task Force. Apparently, the legitimate NGOs departed the region when the threat of armed conflict looked like it would turn into a reality. The NGOs that remained

in theater were loyal to General Cedras and their legitimacy as relief providers was questionable. In addition, the majority of legitimate NGOs in Haiti before the arrival of the Joint Force were concerned with development vice relief. These organizations did not start interacting with the military until nearly thirty days after the JTF's arrival. The result was the military handled the relief efforts on their own during the first month vice supporting the NGOs in the relief effort. Once the NGOs returned, they resumed lead for the relief effort with assistance and coordination from the military via the HACC.²⁰

A close examination of the inter-agency/military/NGO relationship in Haiti illustrates one of the more serious flaws: lack of prior planning between the organizations. Some prior inter-agency coordination did occur, but it needed to be more robust. Operational security (OPSEC) considerations prevented in-depth prior planning efforts with civilian organizations. However, planners must consider and include the NGOs/PVOs at the outset when planning for an operation like Haiti. A lack of communication between strategic, operational, and tactical levels added to the planning confusion.²¹

Strategic level planning began in May of 1994 and included representatives from the National Security Council, Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, the CIA, and USAID. The operational level planning began in June with the establishment of Inter-Agency Working Groups (IWGs) and Joint Task Force Level Coordination. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) took the first steps to establish a CMOC in response to Secretary of Defense Perry's direction. As the initial primary link to the NGO/PVOs, the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) began planning for an increase in the delivery of

food, fuel, medicines, and other relief supplies. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) began an in house planning effort in May. Unfortunately, there was little operational level coordination during the spring and summer.²² This lack of operational level planning/coordination among agencies and NGOs would prove problematic once the operation commenced. The lack of planning led to a degradation of the humanitarian relief efforts. In the future, this degradation may not be affordable to the people on the receiving end.

This analysis of the Military/NGO relationship in Haiti highlights just a few of the many challenges the JFC faces during such an operation. Two lessons stand out. First, the JFC must apply doctrine and language consistently, both within a single operation, and from one operation to the next.²³ Otherwise, he will confuse all the players. Second, planning must begin early. It must be exhaustive at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) and it must include all players. To do otherwise will lead to mediocre results at best, dismal failure at worst.

What does Haiti look like today? Currently, 24 Non-Governmental Organizations and over 500 U.S. Military personnel (down from 20,000 at its peak) are working alongside one another in Haiti. U.S. troops have come under fire from unknown gunmen as recently as 23 April 1999. President Aristide relinquished the presidency in 1996 when his term expired. The democratically elected Rene Preval succeeded him.²⁴ In 1999, the developmental struggle in Haiti continues and the U.S. Military /NGO team continues its contribution to help ease that struggle.

JTF Bravo/JTF Aquila - Central American Relief Efforts Following Hurricane Mitch

Unlike Haiti, no threat of violent opposition existed when U.S. troops arrived in Central America following the devastating blow Hurricane Mitch delivered to the region on 26 October 1998. The local populace and the NGO/PVO community welcomed the U.S. Military. The reason was simple: the military, the NGO community, and the local inhabitants all shared a common enemy. In this battle, Mother Nature and the results of her wrath were the foe. Sharing an opponent made it easier for the participants to attain quickly one of the fundamental principles of any military operation--unity of effort.

In remarks at the Naval War College, General Charles Wilhelm, CINCSOUTH, stated that he and his staff crafted the three phase Central American relief plan on the back of an envelope while on an airplane. Phase I, the emergency assistance phase, primarily involved life saving missions and the emergency delivery of supplies and medical assistance. These efforts sustained the populations until JTF Bravo applied temporary repairs to the infrastructure, enabling the normal flow of essential commodities. Phase II, the rehabilitation phase, consisted of making additional repairs to the infrastructure, thus allowing the nations themselves to provide essential support and health services to their population. JTF Aquila stood up during Phase II. Phase III, the restoration phase, is still ongoing. It is an effort to restore the infrastructure to its pre-storm condition. History will measure the results in years, rather than months. The Desired End State is to get the countries back on their feet and restore a semblance of normalcy to their national capabilities. During Phase III the role of the Department of Defense will gradually diminish, while the role of the inter-agency process, international organizations, and NGOs/PVOs will actually grow considerably.²⁵

During Phase I and Phase II, well-trained, civil-military affairs teams lay at the heart of establishing a positive military/NGO relationship. These teams experienced many successes during their efforts in Central America. The story of the corn seed in Puerto Lempira, a small village devastated by the storm, is just one such success. U.S. Army Captain Albert Zakaib, a JTF Bravo civil- military affairs team leader, coordinated with the World Fund Program to get 25,000 pounds of corn seed to the stricken village whose crops had been destroyed. The Tennessee Air National Guard delivered the seed to the town and the local residents worked alongside U.S. Military and NGO personnel unloading the 500 bags of seed by hand. UN spokes- person James Hardman stated that the 25,000 pounds of corn seed should be enough to provide for 12,000 people.²⁶

The Puerto Lempira corn seed story is an example of success at the tactical level. However, it richly illustrates how a spirit of teamwork and cooperation between the military and the NGO community can help all concerned to accomplish their objectives. It also demonstrates how this spirit of teamwork and cooperation comes much easier when diverse organizations experience a true unity of effort. In this case, the unity of effort led to a common goal--the saving of human lives.

Kosovo – Operation Shining Hope

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nears the completion of its second month of bombing in the former Republic of Yugoslavia through Operation Allied Force, there is another, lesser known, but equally important effort underway—Operation Shining Hope. This is the name given to the Defense Department's

participation in the humanitarian relief efforts in the Balkans. A look at the people involved in a recent White House briefing concerning the Balkan humanitarian crisis highlights the inter-agency process at work and, once again, demonstrates that our military leaders will work with civilian personnel from the NGO/PVO community. After meeting with NGO/PVO representatives on April 2, the president dispatched the following personnel to speak with the press:

Mr. Joe Lockhart – White House Spokesman

Ms. Hattie Babbitt – Deputy Administrator, USAID

LTGEN John McDuffie – Director of Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ms Julia Taft – Assistant Secretary of State, Population, Refugees, and
Migration

Mr. Eric Schwartz – Senior Director, Multi-Lateral and Humanitarian
Affairs, National Security Council

These people represent the highest levels of our government. They are intimately involved in the planning and execution of the Kosovar relief efforts. Their meeting with the President and NGO representatives helped ensure the required spirit of cooperation. In her remarks, Hattie Babbitt stated, “ The NGOs are very supportive of what we as a government have been doing, what we as part of NATO have been doing, and work with us very closely... We are steadfast, the NGOs with whom we work are steadfast. It is an extraordinary challenge, and we are determined, with our international colleagues, to meet it. And we will.”²⁷ Those are powerful words from the USAID Deputy

Administrator, and indicate the strong resolve shared among the organizations involved in the humanitarian relief efforts.

DOD is playing a supporting role in Operation Shining Hope. A brief look at some of the tactical resources dedicated to the operation will help show just how complex the humanitarian assistance mission can be. Military assets from all services are participating. They range from the 167th Airlift Wing out of Martinsburg, West Virginia to the USS Inchon Task Group home-ported in Ingleside, Texas. Heavy and medium lift helicopters from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron Fourteen and Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Eight, both out of Norfolk, Virginia, are also participating.²⁸ Admiral James Ellis (USN), Commander, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, exercises operational command over all U.S. and NATO forces participating in Operation Shining Hope.²⁹

Again, the military/NGO relationship is critical. Operation Shining Hope and the overall relief effort are particularly complex tasks. Current estimates on the number of refugees in the area range between a half and three quarters of a million people. A brief overview of the process used to solve this overwhelming humanitarian problem follows. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) acts as the requirements clearing house. The Department of State receives the requirements from UNHCR and passes them, through USAID, to DOD. DOD then plans and executes the mission to meet the requirements.³⁰ Figure 1 depicts this process.

UNHCR >>> DOS >>> USAID >>> DOD = MISSION EXECUTION

Figure One. Communication flow for logistics requirements in Operation Shining Hope.

In addition to the process depicted above, NATO sends out its own assessment teams to analyze the problem from a military standpoint and determine recommended courses of action. U.S. Military humanitarian assistance teams have also deployed to the region. These teams will supplement the efforts already taking place on the ground. A final link (and it is a critical one) in this multi-faceted chain is the presence of USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DART). The DART teams are composed of resilient, experienced relief workers who know what they are doing and know how to get the job done. They interact well with both the military and the NGOs and help foster cooperation at the grass roots level.³¹

The preceding “big hands” description of Operation Shining Hope merely scratches the surface of the challenges facing Admiral Ellis as he assumes the role of the JFC for the operation. The humanitarian crisis in the Balkans is an extremely complex situation that is still unfolding today. Initial indications, however, demonstrate that the inter-agency/military/NGO relationship is healthy and has, so far, led to the efficient accomplishment of Operation Shining Hope’s objectives.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The challenge of “synergizing” the military/NGO relationship is indeed formidable. As the three operations discussed in this paper have shown, no single, neat formula can be applied to every situation. Each case is unique and must be handled accordingly. However, the three cases generate some ideas and highlight some actions that will prove beneficial.

CMOC

The development of the CMOC during the past decade has proven to be extremely useful. In his article, *Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies*, Andrew Natsios writes, "The most practical mechanism for ensuring that some coherent strategic design and planning does take place is the system of civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), developed to establish and maintain operational contact among the military and humanitarian participants in a complex operation. The CMOCs operational usefulness is clear to most of the humanitarian agencies."³² The JFC must continue to employ the doctrine of establishing CMOCs and should continuously refine this doctrine as he gains more experience in the complex arena of the military/NGO relationship.

Education

Proactive education of both the military officer corps and the NGO leadership will help develop an attitude of trust, vice animosity, between both groups. On the surface it appears that military officers and NGO/PVO personnel come from two very different worlds—that their cultures are completely misaligned and 180 degrees out from one another. A closer scrutiny reveals that the two worlds are not that far apart. Members of both groups value service, dedication, and self-sacrifice. In many operations, they have precisely the same objectives: to restore stability to a region and return the populace to a pre-existing peace. The roads to meet those objectives may vary, but the destination is the same. Educating military officers and NGO/PVO leadership to this end will pay huge dividends.

One way to accomplish this education would be to invite the senior NGO leadership to participate in military exercises, planned operations, and war-gaming events. Imagine the dividends that both the military and the NGO community would reap if the head of CARE (or some other, well known and respected NGO) participated in the inaugural gaming event held at the Naval War College's newest, state of the art facility, McCarty Little Hall. The rewards for both sides would be tremendous.

The corollary to educating NGO leadership at government facilities and during gaming exercises is to educate the military leadership (mid-grade officer or above) at an NGO facility or during an NGO operation. A 15 or 30 day temporary assignment with an agency like the International Rescue Committee (or similar organization) would open the eyes of a military officer to the demanding, yet tremendously beneficial work of a typical NGO. Although the demands already placed on today's military officer are intense, and their available training time is scarce, having a cadre of the nation's military leaders completely exposed to the inner workings of the NGO world would pay considerable long term benefits. It would be well worth the modest investment.

Common Sense and Leadership

Finally, common sense and good leadership must play a role. In Haiti, Central America, and in the Balkans the JFC faced great challenges when interacting with the NGO community. Marine General Anthony Zinni, following his participation in the multi-national relief efforts in Somalia stated, "The morning meeting looked like something out of the bar scene from *Star Wars*."³³ The diverse nature of military operations and the wide variety of people the military commander will work with are likely to expand. There is no Joint Pub the Commander can pull off the shelf to tell him

exactly what to do when he operates with a multi-national coalition and dozens of civilian NGO representatives. He must rely on his good judgement and solid leadership to get the job done.

The military/NGO relationship challenges the best and brightest leaders. However, the principle of perseverance applies. If both the military and NGO leadership commit to work with each other over the long term, together they can accomplish more than they could individually—reaching the true Desired End State of synergy at its best.

End Notes

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- ¹⁹ Leslie Benton and Glen Ware, Haiti: A Case Study of the International Response and the Efficacy of the NGOs in the Crisis (<http://www.law.emory.edu/> 1998) 11.
- ²⁰ Ibid, 13.
- ²¹ Ibid, 18.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Ibid, 14.
- ²⁴ Shelley Emling, "Gis in Danger in Haiti," The Atlanta Constitution, 02May1999, 7A.
- ²⁵ Charles Wilhelm, "DOD News Briefing" 19 November 1998, <http://www.defenselink.mil/>.
- ²⁶ Larry Lang, "U.S., U.N. Groups Seeding New Life in Honduras," American Forces Information Service News Articles, 14 January 1999.
- ²⁷ Joe Lockhart et al, "Special White House Briefing on the Kosovo Humanitarian Crisis," 02 April 1999.
- ²⁸ Inchon Task Group Public Affairs, "USS Inchon Ordered to Adriatic to Help with Refugee Relief," <http://www.cnsi.spear.navy.mil> 08 April 1999
- ²⁹ John McDuffie, "Special Defense Department Briefing on DOD's Participation in Humanitarian Efforts in the Balkans," 02 April 1999.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Lockhart, et al, 3.
- ³² Andrew Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," Parameters, Summer 1996, 50-66.
- ³³ Anthony Zinni, "Military Interaction with Non-Military Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations," An Address to CIA Audience, 06 March 1996.

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